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COMMENTARY
EDUCATION AS A CONSTITUTIONAL ENTITLEMENT:
A PROPOSED JUDICIAL STANDARD FOR
DETERMINING HOW MUCH IS
ENOUGH
BETSY LEVIN*
On the basis of a series of opinions issued by the Supreme Court,
starting with Dandridge v. Williams' and culminating with San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez,' it has been generally as-
sumed that "welfare rights," to use Professor Michelman's term, are not
entitled to special constitutional protection. In these opinions, the
Supreme Court has said that welfare rights, including education, do not
rise to the fundamental level that triggers the strict scrutiny test of
equal protection. Moreover, poverty-if it causes only relatively less of
the basic needs and services rather than their absolute deprivation-is
not suspect and also cannot trigger strict scrutiny. Thus, to obtain spe-
cial constitutional protection for "welfare rights," the deprived class
must be suspect. The closing-off of the "fundamental rights" route,
leaving open only the suspect class route, has led to a number of
problems, both legal and political. I will briefly outline some of the
political and social consequences of not finding a constitutional entitle-
ment to an education.
First, however, I will examine whether finding an entitlement to edu-
cation would stretch the equal protection clause beyond its meaning.
What is being sought? How do you characterize that right? The lan-
guage of the equal protection clause and its traditional interpretation
suggest that the guaranteed right is the right not to be treated differ-
ently than others by government, when the duty of the government is to
remove government-placed barriers or not to install them in the first
place. That the equal protection clause imposes an affirmative duty on
* Professor of Law, Duke University. A.B., 1956, Bryn Mawr College; LL.B., 1966, Yale
University.
1. 397 U.S. 471 (1970). See also Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); James v. Valtierra,
402 U.S. 137 (1971).
2. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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the government to remove a barrier, such as poverty, not necessarily of
the government's making is not as obvious from a reading of the clause.
This latter interpretation has been characterized as a governmental
duty to treat people differently. For example, does the Constitution
entitle children who speak Chinese to special education programs be-
cause they cannot understand what goes on in the regular classroom
where only English is spoken? If so, denial of equal protection of the
law then arises because the governmentfailed to classify them and treat
them differently from all other schoolchildren? Does the equal protec-
tion clause require this kind of affirmative assistance? This inequality
is different from the first-mentioned inequality, in which the govern-
ment treats differently those that it should treat similarly. An example
would be exclusion of Chinese children from the school because they
are Chinese.
I also will suggest that if the assumption is that some welfare rights
can be located in the Constitution, there remains the problem of
whether judicially manageable standards exist to determine to what
level the Constitution guarantees these rights; that is, whether the obli-
gation is one of absolute equality or of some minimal level of educa-
tion.
Finally, is there an alternative model for the entitlement to an educa-
tion that courts could follow without doing violence to the equal pro-
tection clause? I shall suggest that the state school finance cases, by
analogy, may provide a solution.4 If the Supreme Court's reluctance to
find that education is a fundamental right entitled to special protection
under the equal protection clause was due to its fear that no judicially
manageable standards exist for determining the level of constitution-
ally guaranteed education, state courts have shown that courts can ar-
ticulate a standard that does not oblige them to decide issues of
educational policy.
First, let me review where the Supreme Court left education under
the equal protection clause and indicate some of the political conse-
quences of that decision. San Antonio Independent School District vj
Rodriguez5 involved a challenge to the Texas school finance system
3. See Lau v. Nichols, 483 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 414 U.S. 563
(1974).
4. For a more detailed treatment of this thesis, see Levin, The Courts, Congress, and Educa.
tional/Adequacy: The Equal Protection Predicament, 39 MD. L. REV. - (1980).




under which local districts, through authority delegated by the state
legislature, raised funds for education by levying a tax on property lo-
cated within the school district, with some subventions from the state.
Because of significant differences in property wealth among school dis-
tricts, the system resulted in large disparities in per pupil expenditures.
Plaintiffs sought to persuade the Court that the state's school financ-
ing legislation discriminated on the basis of wealth, a "suspect" classifi-
cation, or alternatively, that education was a fundamental right. Either
would trigger the "strict scrutiny" equal protection standard of judicial
review. The Supreme Court, however, found that the Texas system of
financing schools did not discriminate against any class of persons con-
sidered "suspect" because the case dealt with property-poor school dis-
tricts, not persons. Moreover, the wealth discrimination complained of
in Rodriguez did not absolutely deprive any student of an education,
but merely produced relative differences among school districts in the
quality of education. The Court also declared that education was not a
fundamental right because it was neither explicitly nor implicitly guar-
anteed by the Constitution and thus relative differences in education,
unless wholly arbitrary, would be permitted.
This failure to find that the state government has some affirmative
duty to provide education to all equally has not deterred attempts to
find ways to expand educational services. Since the Court clearly said
that there is no affirmative duty in the Constitution to equalize differ-
ences in educational expenditures that result from differences in prop-
erty wealth-because education is not a fundamental right and
children who live in property-poor districts are not a suspect class-the
model followed at the political level created new categories of protected
classes. Thus, Congress and some states, influenced by what the
Supreme Court said, have attempted to identify new categories of "dis-
crete and insular minorities,"6 in which "the political insularity of the
disadvantaged group might call for special scrutiny."7 Some lower fed-
eral and state courts have followed this route as well.8 The alternative
6. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
7. Ely, Toward a Representation-Reinforcing Mode of Judicial Review, 37 MD. L. REV. 451,
455 (1978).
8. See, e.g., Frederick L. v. Thomas, 408 F. Supp. 832, 836 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (dictum); Fi-
alkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946, 949 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (dictum); In re G.H., 218 N.W.2d 441,
447 (N.D. 1974) (handicapped entitled to equal educational opportunity). Contra, New York
State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
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political-legal route would have focused on a guarantee of an adequate
education for all children rather than on singling out special classes.
The protected classes include women,9 the physically and mentally
handicapped,10 the linguistically handicapped," the economically dis-
advantaged, 2 Indians, 13 migrant workers' children,' 4 and so on. Con-
gress, in its statutory mandates, and some courts, in interpreting the
equal protection clause, are saying not only that school authorities must
protect these classes from being treated unequally through the denial of
equal access to educational facilities, books, or teachers, but also that
school authorities are required to treat these groups unequally; that is,
additional resources and special services are to be allocated to these
groups above and beyond the resources and programs provided the av-
erage child.'
5
This approach-identifying new groups as "discrete and insular mi-
norities"-brings with it several problems.' 6 First, who determines
which group is entitled to treatment as a "discrete and insular minor-
ity" and by what criteria? Second, who determines what is an "appro-
priate" education for these various categories and on what basis? For
example, should a learning-disabled child be "mainstreamed" with
supporting services or placed in special classes?" Third, guaranteeing
a certain level of educational services for an increasing number of pro-
tected classes at the expense of the middle class has helped to create a
9. Education Amendments of 1972, §§ 901-907 (Title IX), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1972).
10. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1970) (amended 1978); Education for
All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, §§ 602-66, 20 U.S.C. § 1401-1461 (1970).
11. Bilingual Education Act, §§ 701-751, 20 U.S.C. §§ 3221-3261 (Supp. 1978).
12. Elementary and Secondary Education Amendments of 1978, §§ 101-198 (Title I), 20
U.S.C. §§ 2701-2854 (Supp. 1978) (formerly 20 U.S.C. § 241a).
13. Elementary and Secondary Education Amendments of 1978, § 722 (Title V1I), 20 U.S.C.
§ 3232 (Supp. 1978) ("Indian Children in School"). See also 20 U.S.C. § 2711(d) (Supp. 1978).
14. Elementary and Secondary Education Amendments of 1978, § 101, 20 U.S.C. § 2761
(Supp. 1978) (formerly 20 U.S.C. § 241e(c)).
15. See, e.g., Elementary and Secondary Education Amendments of 1978, §§ 101-198, 20
U.S.C. §§ 2701-2854 (Supp. 1978); Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, §§ 602-
66, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1970).
16. See note 4 supra.
17. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1970) (requires mainstreaming to the
maximum extent appropriate to the needs of the handicapped child) (amended 1978); Education
for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, § 612, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (1975). See also Hair-
ston v. Drosick, 423 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.W. Va. 1976); LeBanks v. Spears, 60 F.R.D. 135 (E.D. La.
1973); Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 886 (D.D.C. 1972); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded
Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
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backlash from the white middle class. Those who are not members of a
"disadvantaged minority," even if they are harmed by a school system's
failure to respond to their educational needs, have little hope for re-
course from the courts because the most permissive standard of equal
protection review will apply. All they can do is try to bring pressure on
legislatures to cut back the resources that the protected classes receive
for private schools. The pressure on Congress for tuition tax credits or
the recent flurry of Proposition 13-type movements in several states are
examples of this backlash. Thus, minorities are set against nonminori-
ties in the competition for resources. Fourth, minorities also battle
against other minorities in the competition for resources, as typified by
the Adams v. Califano 8 litigation. Although it began as a suit to com-
pel HEW to require Title VI compliance by school districts, the Wo-
men's Equity Action League (WEAL) intervened to insure that HEW
did not give Title VI enforcement priority over Title IX enforcement.
Groups representing Hispanics and the handicapped also intervened in
that litigation. Finally, this proliferation of "specially protected"
classes and the sense of competition for resources may increase, rather
than decrease, our distance from a classless and colorblind society in
which we treat people as individuals. Thus, even though the "discrete
and insular minority" approach is often justified, it is not the happiest
of approaches.
On the assumption that the Court was wrong and that Professor
Michelman is correct about the Constitution protecting the so-called
welfare rights, are not there still problems in defining the constitutional
right to equality of basic subsistence needs such as food or housing and
basic services such as health or education?
Professor Michelman wants to locate these "welfare" rights-ex-
panding on Professor Ely's constitutional interpretivist approach 9 -in
the open-ended guaranties of the fourteenth amendment and, perhaps,
in the ninth amendment under a theory of representation-reinforce-
ment. In other words, if various basic needs and services will insure
participation in the political processes, including the benefits of those
processes, then the government must correct their maldistribution.
What level of goods and services will reinforce representation or par-
ticipation? How much is enough? Professor Michelman has given us
18. 430 F. Supp. 118 (D.D.C. 1977).
19. See Ely, supra note 7.
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some cogent arguments why the government has an affirmative duty to
treat some people (primarily indigents) differently. He has attempted
to show how some interests-housing, clothing, food-are grounded in
the Constitution because they relate to effective participation in the sys-
tem and how others might not. Indeed, in his view education might be
less crucial to effective political participation than food or shelter. He
has not indicated, however, how we determine what the duty of the
government is-whether the government must provide everyone with
an opportunity to obtain some level of goods or services by increasing
access to the political-economic process or by making cash or in-kind
payments. Or is the duty to insure equal outcomes; that is, no one may
have a better education or a better house than another. In our society,
except in a very few areas, there is little absolute deprivation. Differ-
ences are relative. Where can the courts draw the line? How much of
X is necessary to enable one to participate effectively in the political
process if we say that the entitlement is not to the same amount of X
that everyone else has?
Thus, whether welfare rights-and, for my purposes, the right to an
education-are characterized as fundamental or as representation-rein-
forcing, we have the problem of determining the level of the constitu-
tional guarantee. Is a poor person entitled to the same housing as
others, a one-acre lot house, or a minimal level shelter-! e., something
with a roof and outdoor plumbing? Must education be absolutely
equal or are children merely entitled to a basic level of education, and
if so, what guidelines are there for determining what is basic?
Is there an alternative approach to determining what a constitutional
entitlement to an education might be that avoids this difficulty? In the
absence of absolute deprivation of minimal basic skills, which the
Court in Rodriguez indicated might be a fundamental right,2 ° was there
a standard by which the Court could ascertain whether the government
satisfied or violated an individual's right to equal access to an educa-
tion? If we turn to the school finance litigation strategies under state
constitutions, we may find a model that courts could adapt to the fed-
eral equal protection clause without doing violence to the clause.
The Rodriguez case, as presented to the Supreme Court, followed the
model used in Serrano v. Priest.2' Serrano articulated a simple fiscal
20. 411 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1973).




neutrality theory that the level of spending for a child's education may
not be a function of property wealth other than the wealth of the state
as a whole.22 Thus, despite the arguments based on fundamental rights
and suspect classes, Rodriguez was framed as a taxpayer equity suit
rather than an equal education suit. The focus was on equalization of
fiscal capacity--equalizing the property tax base.
A number of state courts have rejected this approach, focusing in-
stead on assuring an adequate education to all children. 3 The leading
case is Robinson v. Cahill,24 in which the New Jersey Supreme Court
overturned that state's school finance scheme on the ground that it vio-
lated the state's constitutional command to the legislature to provide a
"thorough and efficient system of free public schools." 25 In construing
this state constitutional provision, the court stated that "the constitu-
tion's guarantee must be understood to embrace that educational op-
portunity which is needed in the contemporary setting to equip a child
for his role as a citizen and as a competitor in the labor market,"26
suggesting an outcomes or basic-achievement level standard.
The New Jersey court then held that there was no relationship be-
tween the educational needs of school districts and their tax bases, "un-
less we were to suppose the unlikely proposition that the lowest level of
dollar performance happens to coincide with the constitutional man-
date and that all efforts beyond the lowest level are attributable to local
decisions to do more than the State was obliged to do."27
Nevertheless, because equal educational opportunity is the provision
of an educational floor or basic level of adequacy, local leeway beyond
that level would be allowed. "[N]or do we say that if the State assumes
the cost of providing the constitutionally mandated education, it may
not authorize local government to go further. .. .
Seattle School District v. Washington, 9 another school finance case,
also suggested a mandatory basic level of education standard, although
the language focused solely on inputs rather than pupil outcomes. In
22. Id. at 589, 487 P.2d at 1244, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
23. For a detailed analysis of these cases, see Levin, Current Trends in School Finance Reform
Litigation: A Commentary, 1977 DuKE L.J. 1099.
24. 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
25. NJ. CONsT. art. VIII, § 4, 1.
26. 62 N.J. 473, 515, 303 A.2d 273, 295 (1973).
27. Id. at 516, 303 A.2d at 295.
28. Id. at 520, 303 A.2d at 298.
29. 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978).
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that case, the trial court held that the state's "paramount duty" was to
guarantee sufficient funds to support a "basic education" without rely-
ing on voted local levies. But once the state fulfills its duty of supplying
every district with a basic education, expenditure disparities resulting
from local choice constitutionally may exist, even if they are a direct
consequence of district wealth.30
The Washington state supreme court affirmed, noting that the consti-
tutional duty went beyond the "basic minimal skills" of "mere reading,
writing and arithmetic." The Washington court, echoing the terms of
the New Jersey court in Robinson, held that the constitutional duty
"also embraces broad educational opportunities needed in the contem-
porary setting to equip our children for their role as citizens and as
potential competitors in today's market as well as the marketplace of
ideas. 31
The trial court used several approaches to determine whether the
state had, absent a legislative definition of a basic program, met its con-
stitutional duty to make "ample provision for the education of all chil-
dren residing within its borders. 32 One approach was to "cost out" the
current requirements imposed on school districts by state statutes and
the regulations of the State Board of Education and to measure that
amount against the amount of state funds received by the Seattle school
district. Another approach determined the costs associated with oper-
ating those programs necessary for the Seattle district to obtain or
maintain state accreditation. Applying these standards, the funding
level for education under existing law was insufficient in plaintiff-dis-
trict.
This brief look at some of the state school finance cases suggests that
courts can articulate a principle of a right to an adequate education
without requiring the state to provide the same level of education to all
children in the state or having to "legislate" the kind of education to
which a child is entitled. The legislature is left to define that education
which is basic.
One could argue that these courts have articulated an empty princi-
ple if the states can define what is basic, for that could mean no kinder-
gartens, no foreign languages, 33 or even no reading or arithmetic.
30. Civ. No. 53950 (Wash., Thurston County Super. Ct. Jan. 14, 1977).
31. 90 Wash. 2d at 517, 585 P.2d at 94.
32. WASH. CONST. art. 9, § 1.




However, there are two limiting principles. One is the absolute mini-
mal education that the Rodriguez Court hinted might be a constitu-
tional right--"the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of
the rights of speech and of full participation in the political process."
34
Some city districts today are graduating significant numbers of func-
tional illiterates. A New York state trial court in Board of Education v.
Nyquist 5 found that large concentrations of students in the urban dis-
tricts in New York were absolutely deprived of an education by the
state-aid statute. The court thus held that the statute violated the fed-
eral equal protection clause under Rodrguez36 as well as the state con-
stitution.37
The other limiting principle is the requirement in several state cases
that the necessary skills to compete in today's labor market must be
provided. Minimal basic skills are clearly not enough in today's tech-
nological society. Thus, these courts must mean that the entitlement is
to more than ditch-digging skills, but less than brain surgeon skills.
Of course, this is only a model that courts could have followed in
applying the federal equal protection clause. There are clearly differ-
ences-at least superficially-between the constitutional claim made in
Rodriguez and those made under state constitutions. Education is not
mentioned in the federal Constitution, but was explicitly mandated by
the state constitutions construed in the cases under consideration. In
addition, the constitutional claim is raised under the duty to provide an
education, although in some of these cases it is also raised under the
state's equal protection clause.38 Nevertheless, the state court approach
demonstrates that courts can articulate a standard without having to
decide issues of educational policy or without requiring absolute equal-
ity.
What the state courts seem to be suggesting is that a state must be
concerned with the educational needs of its children-indeed, by pro-
attempt to comply with the trial court's order in Seattle School District. The Basic Education Act
of 1977 excludes foreign languages from the definition of basic education, leaving it to district
discretion-meaning locally raised funds. 1977 Wash. Laws, ch. 359, § 3.
34. 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973).
35. 94 Misc. 2d 466, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
36. Id. at 530-32, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 641-42.
37. Id. at 532-34, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 642-43.
38. See. e.g., Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., Civ. No. C-73688 (Colo., Denver County
Dist. Ct. December 12, 1977); Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977); Board of
Educ. v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d 466, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
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viding publicly supported, compulsory schooling, it already has ex-
pressed this concern. A state, moreover, cannot meet its concerns by a
system that relies heavily on the haphazard location of property wealth
and the whims of local voters within political subdivisions that are
often not coterminous with any other political boundary.
In other words, the standard for determining whether the constitu-
tional duty to provide education equitably is still somewhat of a nega-
tive standard in the sense that the original fiscal neutrality principle
proposed by the Rodriguez plaintiffs was negative, but state courts have
modified the standard as follows: educational opportunities may not
be a function of local school district fiscal capacity (reflecting munici-
pal and educational overburdens as well as property wealth) and the
whims and preferences of local school district voters. The level of edu-
cation offered cannot depend on a municipality's willingness to ap-
prove local tax levies. This standard is accompanied by an affirmative
"education need" standard, which differs from the simple fiscal neu-
trality principle in that the state guarantees an educational floor, but
permits localities to choose the level of program they desire to provide
beyond the basic state-provided program.
If courts applied this standard to the federal equal protection clause,
they would not need to determine how much education was adequate.
Courts would not have to "fashion a constitutional command that a
designated minimum of. . .[educational] services. . . be distributed
to the poor [districts]."3 9 The courts would merely command the state
to devise a system that funds that level of education which the state
already has indicated it considers basic rather than having what is an
"adequate" education program determined by the amount of property
wealth a district zoned in or out in prior years.
Finally, the courts would be deciding not that education "is a funda-
mental interest and recreation is not,"40 but that because the state has
declared the fundamental importance of education, making it compul-
sory and public, it must ensure a basic level of education for all. Had
the Supreme Court taken this approach in Rodriguez, it could not be
accused of acting as a "national school board. 41 Moreover, as the
states themselves often declare in their own constitutions, education is
39. Winter, Poverty, Economic Equality, and The Equal Protection Clause, 1972 Sup. CT.
REv. 41, 92.
40. Id. at 93.




the key to democratic values. In Ely's language, it is "representation-
reinforcing." States have not so declared recreation, or even housing or
health.
Education is a publicly provided governmental service for rich and
poor alike, purchased not with personal wealth-in contrast to the pri-
mary reliance on the market for housing, food, and health care-but
with district wealth, the state determining the boundaries of that
wealth.42 And myth though it may be, education is seen as the key to
social mobility, to breaking the poverty cycle, and to obtaining access
to adequate food, shelter, and other subsistence needs. Thus, courts
can justifiably entitle education to special constitutional protection ei-
ther because it is a "fundamental right" or because it is "representa-
tion-reinforcing." And, as I have attempted to show, there are
judicially manageable standards for determining the extent of the gov-
ernment's affirmative constitutional duty without requiring it to insure
absolute equality of educational services.
42, Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword" On Protecting the Poor Through
the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 48 (1969).
Number 3]
Washington University Open Scholarship
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss3/4
